![]() ![]() It all depends on your risk profile and threats. In one extreme, you'd need a HSM or a smartcard, but in less-stringent environments storing the key on the filesystem with the right permissions might be sufficient. If you run this command several times, you will notice each. First try this: openssl enc -aes-256-cbc -pass pass:MYPASSWORD -P. You can also use the -p (lowercase P) to print the salt, key and IV, and then proceed with the encryption. NET / Microsoft environment I am guessing you should be looking at DPAPI, although there may be better options out there. At the command-line, you can use the -P option (uppercase P) to print the salt, key and IV, and then exit. There are probably many solutions to storing keys securely, but those depend on the level of security you really need. As long as the key itself is strong, using a different key does not give you any advantage (in fact, it will be a real headache to manage), so one key should usually be good enough. The encryption and decryption here is not reciprocal, the key must be transformed (-3 to +3) to alter the direction of the shift when moving between encryption. There should be no issue using the same key for all records in terms of security. That leaves your problem to storing a relatively small piece of information: the key. Ideally, each row IV would be unique and random but not secret. ![]() Storing the IV in the database for each row will eliminate the concern over losing this data. The following example shows the creation of a new instance of the default implementation class for the Aes algorithm: Dim aes As Aes Aes.Create() Aes aes Aes.Create() The execution of the preceding code generates a new. ![]() Sending the key across an insecure network without encryption is unsafe because anyone who intercepts the key and IV can then decrypt your data. If you don't have a handy way to separate the IV and ciphertext in your. The IV needs to be unique (with a given key) and for some cipher modes also needs to be unpredictable, but it does not need to be secret sending it in plain text alongside the ciphertext is fine. It usually acts as a salt, to avoid a situation where two identical plaintext records get encrypted into identical ciphertext. To communicate a symmetric key and IV to a remote party, you usually encrypt the symmetric key by using asymmetric encryption. Either prepending or appending the IV is standard practice. The IV itself is not supposed to be secret. At least one thing you can improve rather easily: You can simply store the IV in the database next to the encrypted data. ![]()
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